# Abstract

The study investigated the effect of information structure on people's contribution behaviors under a real-time self-paced sequential protocol (SPS) of game. Groups of seven players participated in a step-level public goods dilemma framed as an investment game. Under the SPS protocol, participants were given a fixed time period to make their decisions. They not only decided on *whether* to contribute to the public good, they also decided on *when* to make the decision. Four information structures were manipulated: (a) in the Full Information condition, participants were instantaneously updated with the number of people contributing and not contributing to the public good, (b) in the Cooperation Information condition, participants knew only the number of people contributing, and (c) in the Defection Information condition, only the number of people not contributing, and (d) in the No Information condition, no information was given. Results found that under the SPS protocol, relative to the No Information condition, information about previous cooperation choices was equally effective as providing full information in enhancing public good provision. Providing non-contribution information resulted in the lowest public good provision rate. Contradicting results as reported by Erev and Rapoport (1990) under a sequential protocol would be discussed.